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Abstract
Levesque introduced the notion of only-knowing to precisely capture the beliefs of a knowledge
base. He also showed how only-knowing can be used to formalize non-monotonic behavior within
a monotonic logic. Despite its appeal, all attempts to extend only-knowing to the many agent case
have undesirable properties. A belief model by Halpern and Lakemeyer, for instance, appeals to
proof-theoretic constructs in the semantics and needs to axiomatize validity as part of the logic.
It is also not clear how to generalize their ideas to a first-order case. In this paper, we propose a
new account of multi-agent only-knowing which, for the first time, has a natural possible-world
semantics for a quantified language with equality. We then provide, for the propositional fragment,
a sound and complete axiomatization that faithfully lifts Levesque’s proof theory to the many agent
case. We also discuss comparisons to the earlier approach by Halpern and Lakemeyer.
1 Introduction
Levesque’s notion of only-knowing is a single agent monotonic logic that was proposed with the in-
tention of capturing certain types of nonmonotonic reasoning. Levesque ([1990]) already showed
that there is a close connection to Moore’s ([1985]) autoepistemic logic (AEL). Recently, Lakemeyer
and Levesque ([2005]) showed that only-knowing can be adapted to capture default logic as well.
The main benefit of using Levesque’s logic is that, via simple semantic arguments, nonmonotonic
conclusions can be reached without the use of meta-logical notions such as fixpoints [Rosati 2000;
Levesque & Lakemeyer 2001] . Only-knowing is then naturally of interest in a many agent context,
since agents capable of non-trivial nonmonotonic behavior should believe other agents to also be equipped
with nonmonotonic mechanisms. For instance, if all that Bob knows is that Tweety is a bird and a default
that birds typically fly, then Alice, if she knows all that Bob knows, concludes that Bob believes Tweety
can fly.1 Also, the idea of only-knowing a collection of sentences is useful for modeling the beliefs of a
knowledge base (KB), since sentences that are not logically entailed by the KB are taken to be precisely
those not believed. If many agents are involved, and suppose Alice has some beliefs on Bob’s KB, then
she could capitalize on Bob’s knowledge to collaborate on tasks, or plan a strategy against him.
As a logic, Levesque’s construction is unique in the sense that in addition to a classical epistemic
operator for belief, he introduces a modality to denote what is at most known. This new modality
has a subtle relationship to the belief operator that makes extensions to a many agent case non-trivial.
Most extensions so far make use of arbitrary Kripke structures, that already unwittingly discard the
simplicity of Levesque’s semantics. They also have some undesirable properties, perhaps invoking
some caution in their usage. For instance, in a canonical model (Lakemeyer 1993), certain types of
epistemic states cannot be constructed. In another Kripke approach (Halpern 1993), the modalities do
not seem to interact in an intuitive manner. Although an approach by Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001])
does indeed successfully model multi-agent only-knowing, it forces us to have the semantic notion
of validity directly in the language and has proof-theoretic constructs in the semantics via maximally
consistent sets. Precisely for this reason, that proposal is not natural, and it is matched with a proof
theory that has a set of new axioms to deal with these new notions. It is also not clear how one can
extend their semantics to the first-order case. Lastly, an approach by Waaler ([2004]) avoids such an
axiomatization of validity, but the model theory also has problems [Waaler & Solhaug 2005]. Technical
discussions on their semantics are deferred to later.
The goal of this paper is to show that there is indeed a natural semantics for multi-agent only-
knowing for the quantified language with equality. For the propositional subset, there is also a sound
and complete axiomatization that faithfully generalizes Levesque’s proof theory.2 We also differ from
Halpern and Lakemeyer in that we do not enrich the language any more than necessary (modal operators
for each agent), and we do not make use of canonical Kripke models. And while canonical models, in
general, are only workable semantically and can not be used in practice, our proposal has a computa-
tional appeal to it. We also show that if we do enrich the language with a modal operator for validity,
but only to establish a common language with [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001], then we agree on the set of
valid sentences. Finally, we obtain a first-order multi-agent generalization of AEL, defined solely using
notions of classical logical entailment and theoremhood.
1We use the terms ”knowledge” and ”belief” interchangeably in the paper.
2The proof theory for a quantified language is well known to be incomplete for the single agent case. It is also known that
any complete axiomatization cannot be recursive [Halpern & Lakemeyer 1995; Levesque & Lakemeyer 2001].
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review Levesque’s notions,3 and define a se-
mantics with so-called k-structures. We then compare the framework to earlier attempts. Following
that, we introduce a sound and complete axiomatization for the propositional fragment. In the last sec-
tions, we sketch the multi-agent (first-order) generalization of AEL, and prove that k-structures and
[Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] agree on valid sentences, for an enriched language. Then, we conclude
and end.
2 The k-structures Approach
The non-modal part of Levesque’s logic4 ONL consists of standard first-order logic with= and a count-
ably infinite set of standard names N .5 To keep matters simple, function symbols are not considered in
this language. We call a predicate other than =, applied to first-order variables or standard names, an
atomic formula. We write αxn to mean that the variable x is substituted in α by a standard name. If all
the variables in a formula α are substituted by standard names, then we call it a ground formula. Here,
a world is simply a set of ground atoms, and the semantics is defined over the set of all possible worlds
W . The standard names are thus rigid designators, and denote precisely the same entities in all worlds.
ONL also has two modal operators: L and N . While Lα is to be read as ”at least α is known”, Nα
is to be read as ”at most ¬α is known”. A set of possible worlds is referred to as the agent’s epistemic
state e. Defining a model to be the pair (e, w) for w ∈ W , components of ONL’s meaning of truth are:
1. e, w |= p iff p ∈ w and p is a ground atom,
2. e, w |= (m = n) iff m and n are identical standard names,
3. e, w |= ¬α iff e, w 6|= α,
4. e, w |= α ∨ β iff e, w |= α or e, w |= β,
5. e, w |= ∀x. α iff e, w |= αxn for all standard names n,
6. e, w |= Lα iff for all w′ ∈ e, e, w′ |= α, and
7. e, w |= Nα iff for all w′ 6∈ e, e, w′ |= α.
The main idea is that α is (at least) believed iff it is true at all worlds considered possible, while (at
most) α is believed to be false iff it is true at all worlds considered impossible. So, an agent is said to
only-know α, syntactically expressed as Lα ∧N¬α, when worlds in e are precisely those where α is
true. Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001]) underline three features of the semantical framework of ONL,
the intuitions of which we desire to maintain in the many agent setting:
1. Evaluating Nα does not affect the epistemic possibilities. Formally, in ONL, after evaluating
formulas of the form Nα the agent’s epistemic state is still given by e.
3There are other notions of ”all I know”, which will not be discussed here [Halpern & Moses 1985;
Ben-David & Gafni 1989]. Also see [Rosati 2000].
4We name the logic following [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] for ease of comparisons later on. It is referred to as OL in
[Halpern & Lakemeyer 1995; Levesque & Lakemeyer 2001].
5More precisely, we have logical connectives ∨, ∀ and ¬. Other connectives are taken for their usual syntactic abbrevia-
tions.
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2. A union of the agent’s possibilities, that evaluate L, and the impossible worlds that evaluate N ,
is fixed and independent of e, and is the set of all conceivable states. Formally, in ONL, Lα is
evaluated wrt. worlds w ∈ e, and Nα is evaluated wrt. worlds w ∈ W − e; the union of which is
W . The intuition is that the exact complement of an agent’s possibilities is used in evaluating N .
3. Given any set of possibilities, there is always a model where precisely this set is the epistemic
state. Formally, in ONL, any subset of W can be defined as the epistemic state.
Although these notions seem clear enough in the single agent case, generalizing them to the many agent
case is non-trivial [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001]. We shall return to analyze the features shortly. Let
us begin by extending the language. Let ONLn be a first-order modal language that enriches the non-
modal subset of ONL with modal operators Li and Ni for i = a, b. For ease of exposition, we only
have two agents a (Alice) and b (Bob). Extensions to more agents is straightforward. We freely use Oi,
such that Oiα is an abbreviation for Liα ∧Ni¬α, and is read as ”all that i knows is α”. Objective and
subjective formulas are understood as follows.
Definition 2.1: The i-depth of a formula α, denoted |α|i, is defined inductively as (i denotes Li or
Ni):
1. |α|i = 1 for atoms,
2. |¬α|i = |α|i,
3. |∀x. α|i = |α|i,
4. |α ∨ β|i = max(|α|i, |β|i),
5. |iα|i = |α|i ,
6. |jα|i = |α|j + 1, for j 6= i
A formula has a depth k if max(a-depth,b-depth) = k. A formula is called i-objective if all epistemic
operators which do not occur within the scope of another epistemic operator are of the form j for
i 6= j. A formula is called i-subjective if every atom is in the scope of an epistemic operator and all
epistemic operators which do not occur within the scope of another epistemic operator are of the form
i.
For example, a formula of the form LaLbLap ∨ Lbq has a depth of 4, a a-depth of 3 and a b-depth
of 4. Lbq is both b-subjective and a-objective. A formula is called objective if it does not mention any
modal operators. A formula is called basic if it does not mention any Ni for i = a, b. We now define
a notion of epistemic states using k-structures. The main intuition is that we keep separate the worlds
Alice believes from the worlds she considers Bob to believe, to depth k.
Definition 2.2: A k-structure (k ≥ 1), say ek, for an agent is defined inductively as:
− e1 ⊆ W × {{}},
− ek ⊆ W × Ek−1, where Em is the set of all m-structures.
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A e1 for Alice, denoted as e1a, is intended to represent a set of worlds {〈w, {}〉, . . .}. A e2 is of the form
{〈w, e1b 〉, 〈w
′, e′
1
b〉, . . .}, and it is to be read as ”at w, she believes Bob considers worlds from e1b possible
but at w′, she believes Bob to consider worlds from e′1b possible”. This conveys the idea that Alice has
only partial information about Bob, and so at different worlds, her beliefs about what Bob knows differ.
We define a ek for Alice, a ej for Bob and a world w ∈ W as a (k, j)-model (eka, e
j
b
, w). Only sentences
of a maximal a-depth of k, and a maximal b-depth of j are interpreted wrt. a (k, j)-model. The complete
semantic definition is:
1. eka, e
j
b
, w |= p iff p ∈ w and p is a ground atom,
2. eka, e
j
b , w |= (m = n) iff m,n ∈ N and are identical,
3. eka, e
j
b , w |= ¬α iff eka, e
j
b, w 6|= α,
4. eka, e
j
b
, w |= α ∨ β iff eka, e
j
b
, w |= α or eka, e
j
b
, w |= β,
5. eka, e
j
b , w |= ∀x. α iff eka, e
j
b, w |= α
x
n for all n ∈ N ,
6. eka, e
j
b , w |= Laα iff for all 〈w′, e
k−1
b 〉 ∈ e
k
a,
eka, e
k−1
b , w
′ |= α,
7. eka, e
j
b
, w |= Naα iff for all 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ e
k
a,
eka, e
k−1
b
, w′ |= α
And since Oaα syntactically denotes Laα ∧Na¬α, it follows from the semantics that
8. eka, e
j
b
, w |= Oaα iff for all worlds w′, for all ek−1 for Bob, 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 ∈ e
k
a iff eka, ek−1b , w
′ |= α
(The semantics for Lbα and Nbα are given analogously.) A formula α (of a-depth of k and of b-depth
of j) is satisfiable iff there is a (k, j)-model such that eka, ejb , w |= α. The formula is valid (|= α) iff
α is true at all (k, j)-models. Satisfiability is extended to a set of formulas Σ (of maximal a, b-depth
of k, j) in the manner that there is a (k, j)-model eka, ejb , w such that eka, ejb, w |= α′ for every α′ ∈ Σ.
We write Σ |= α to mean that for every (k, j)-model eka, e
j
b , w, if eka, e
j
b, w |= α
′ for all α′ ∈ Σ, then
eka, e
j
b, w |= α.
Validity is not affected if models of a depth greater than that needed are used. This is to say, if α
is true wrt. all (k, j)-models, then α is true wrt. all (k′, j′)-models for k′ ≥ k, j′ ≥ j. We obtain this
result by constructing for every ek′a , a k-structure ea↓k
′
k , such that they agree on all formulas of maximal
a-depth k. Analogously for ej
′
b .
Definition 2.3: Given ek′a , we define ea↓k
′
k for k′ ≥ k ≥ 1:
1. ea↓11 = e1a,
2. ea↓k
′
1 = {〈w, {}〉 | 〈w, e
k′−1
b
〉 ∈ ek
′
a },
3. ea↓k
′
k = {〈w, eb↓
k′−1
k−1 〉 | 〈w, e
k′−1
b 〉 ∈ e
k′
a }.
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Lemma 2.4: For all formulas α of maximal a, b-depth of k, j, ek′a , ej
′
b
, w |= α iff ea↓k′k , eb↓j
′
j , w |= α,
for k′ ≥ k, j′ ≥ j.
Proof: By induction on the depth of formulas. The proof immediately holds for atomic formulas,
disjunctions and negations since we have the same world w. Assume that the result holds for formulas
of a, b-depth 1. Let α such a formula, and suppose ek′a , e
j′
b , w |= Laα (where Laα has a, b-depth of 1, 2).
Then, for all 〈w′, ek′−1b 〉 ∈ ek
′
a , e
k′
a , e
k′−1
b , w
′ |= α iff (by induction hypothesis) ea↓k′1 , eb↓k
′
−1
1 , w
′ |= α
iff ea↓k
′
2 , {}, w |= Laα. By construction, we also have ea↓k
′
1 , {}, w |= Laα. Lastly, since Laα is
a-subjective, b’s structure is irrelevant, and thus, ea↓k′1 , eb↓j
′
2 , w |= Laα.
For the reverse direction, suppose ea↓k
′
1 , eb↓
j′
2 , w |= Laα. Then for all w′ ∈ ea↓k
′
1 , ea↓
k′
1 , {}, w
′ |=
α iff (by construction) for all 〈w′, ek′−1b 〉 ∈ ek
′
a , e
k′
a , e
k′−1
b , w
′ |= α iff ek′a , {}, w |= Laα. Since b’s
structure is irrelevant, we have ek′a , e
j′
b , w |= Laα. The cases for Lbα, Naα and Nbα are completely
symmetric.
Theorem 2.5: For all formulas α of a, b-depth of k, j, if α is true at all (k, j)-models, then α is true at
all (k′, j′)-models with k′ ≥ k and j′ ≥ j.
Proof: Suppose α is true at all (k, j)-models. Given any (k′, j′)-model, by assumption ea↓k
′
k , eb↓
j′
j , w |=
α and by Lemma 2.4, ek′a , e
j′
b , w |= α.
Knowledge with k-structures satisfy weak S5 properties, and the Barcan formula [Hughes & Cresswell 1972].
Lemma 2.6: If α is a formula, the following are valid wrt. models of appropriate depth (i denotes Li
or Ni):
1. iα ∧i(α ⊃ β) ⊃ iβ,
2. iα ⊃ iiα,
3. ¬iα ⊃ i¬iα,
4. ∀x. iα ⊃ i(∀x. α).
Proof: The proofs are similar. For item 3, wlog let i be La. Suppose eka, e
j
b , w |= ¬Laα. There is
some 〈w′, ek−1
b
〉 ∈ eka such that eka, ek−1b , w
′ |= ¬α. Let w′′ be any world such that 〈w′′, e′k−1b 〉 ∈ eka.
Then, eka, e′
k−1
b , w
′′ |= ¬Laα. Thus, eka, e
j
b , w |= La¬Laα. The case of Na is analogous.
Before moving on, let us briefly reflect on the fact that k-structures have finite depth. So suppose a
only-knows KB, of depth k. Using k-structures allows us to reason about what is believed, up to depth
k. Also, if we construct epistemic states from k′-structures where k′ ≥ k, then the logic correctly cap-
tures non-beliefs beyond the depth k. To illustrate, let true (depth 1) be all that a knows. Then, it can
easily be shown that both the sentences Oa(true) ⊃ ¬La¬Lbα and Oa(true) ⊃ ¬LaLbα are valid
sentences in the logic, by considering any e2 (and higher) for a. For most purposes, this restriction of
having a parameter k seems harmless in the sense that agents usually have a finite knowledge base with
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sentences of some maximal depth k and they should not be able to conclude anything about what is
known at depths higher than k, with one exception. If we were to include a notion of common knowl-
edge [Fagin, Halpern, Moses & Vardi 1995], then we would get entailments about what is believed at
arbitrary depths. With our current model, this cannot be captured, but we are willing to pay that price
because in return we get, for the first time, a very simple possible-world style account of only-knowing.
Similarly, we have nothing to say about (infinite) knowledge bases with unbounded depth.
3 Multi-Agent Only-Knowing
In this section, we return to the features of only-knowing discussed earlier and verify that the new
semantics reasonably extends them to the multi-agent case. We also briefly discuss earlier attempts at
capturing these features. Halpern ([1993]), Lakemeyer ([1993]), and Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001])
independently attempted to extend ONL to the many agent case.6 There are some subtle differences
in their approaches, but the main restriction is they only allow a propositional language. Henceforth,
to make the comparison feasible, we shall also speak of the propositional subset of ONLn with the
understanding that the semantical framework is now defined for propositions (from an infinite set Φ)
rather than ground atoms.
The main component in these features is the notion of possibility. In the single agent case, each
world represents a possibility. Thus, from a logical viewpoint, a possibility is simply the set of objective
formulas true at some world. Further, the set of epistemic possibilities is given by {{objective formulas true atw} |
w ∈ e}. Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001]) correctly argue that the appropriate generalization of the no-
tion of possibility in the many agent case are i-objective formulas. Intuitively, a possible state of affairs
according to a include the state of the world (objective formulas), as well as what b is taken to believe.
The earlier attempts by Halpern and Lakemeyer use Kripke structures with accessibility relations Ki for
each agent i. Given a Kripke structure M , the notion of possibility is defined as the set of i-objective for-
mulas true at some Kripke world, and the set of epistemic possibilities is obtained from the i-objective
formulas true at all i-accessible worlds. Formally, the set of epistemic possibilities true at (M,w), where
w is a world in M , is defined as {obj+i (M,w′) | w′ ∈ Ki(w)}, where obj+i (M,w′) is a set consisting
of i-objective formulas true at (M,w′).7 Although intuitive, note that, even for the propositional sub-
set of ONL, a Kripke world is a completely different entity from what Levesque supposes. Perhaps,
one consequence is that the semantic proofs in earlier approaches are very involved. In contrast, we
define worlds exactly as Levesque supposes. And, our notion of possibility is obtained from the set of
a-objective formulas true at each 〈w, ek−1
b
〉 in eka.
Definition 3.1: Suppose M = (eka, e
j
b
, w) is a (k, j)-model.
1. let obj+i (M) = {i-objective φ |M |= φ},
2. let Obj+a (eka) = {obj+a ({}, ek−1b , w) | 〈w, ek−1b 〉 ∈ eka},
3. let Obj+
b
(ej
b
) = {obj+
b
(ej−1a , {}, w) | 〈w, e
j−1
a 〉 ∈ e
j
b
}.
6For space reasons, we do not review all aspects of these approaches.
7The superscript + denotes that the set includes non-basic formulas. Given X+, we letX = {φ is basic | φ ∈ X+}.
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All the a-objective formulas true at a model M , essentially the objective formulas true wrt. w and the
b-subjective formulas true wrt. ej
b
, are given by obj+a (M). Note that these formulas do not strictly
correspond to a’s possibilities. Rather, we define Obj+a on her epistemic state eka, and this gives us
all the a-objectives formulas that a considers possible. We shall now argue that the intuition of all of
Levesque’s properties is maintained.8
Property 1. In the single agent case, this property ensured that an agent’s epistemic possibilities are
not affected on evaluating N . This is immediately the case here. Given a model, say (eka, e
j
b, w),
a’s epistemic possibilities are determined by Obj+a (eka). To evaluate Naα, we consider all models
(eka, e
k−1
b , w
′) such that 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ eka. Again, a’s possibilities are given by Obj
+
a (e
k
a) for all these
models, and does not change.
Property 2. In the single agent case, this property ensured that evaluating Lα and Nα is always
wrt. the set of all possibilities, and completely independent of e. As discussed, in the many agent
case, possibilities mean i-objective formulas and analogously, if α is a possibility in a’s view, say
an a-objective formula of maximal b-depth of k, then we should interpret Laα and Naα wrt. all a-
objective possibilities of max. depth k: the set of (k+1)-structures. Clearly then, the result is fixed and
independent of the corresponding ek+1. The following lemma is a direct consequence of the definition
of the semantics.
Lemma 3.2: Let α be a i-objective formula of j-depth k, for j 6= i. Then, the set of k+1-structures
that evaluate Liα and Niα is Ek+1.
Property 3. The third property ensures that one can characterize epistemic states from any set of i-
objective formulas. Intuitively, given such a set, we must have a model where precisely this set is the
epistemic state. Earlier attempts at clarifying this property involved constructing a set of maximally
K45n-consistent sets of basic i-objective formulas, and showing that there exist an epistemic state that
precisely corresponds to this set. But, defining possibilities via K45n proof-theoretic machinery in-
evitably leads to some limitations, as we shall see. We instead proceed semantically, and go beyond
basic formulas. Let Ω be a satisfiable set of i-objective formulas, say of maximal j-depth k, for j 6= i.
Let Ω′ be a set obtained by adding a i-objective formula γ of maximal j-depth k such that Ω′ is also
satisfiable. By considering all i-objective formulas of maximal j-depth k, let us construct Ω′, Ω′′, . . . by
adding formulas iff the resultant set remains satisfiable. When we are done, the resulting Ω∗ is what we
shall call a maximally satisfiable i-objective set.9 Naturally, there may be many such sets corresponding
to Ω. We show that given a set of maximally satisfiable i-objective sets, there is a model where precisely
this set characterizes the epistemic state.
Theorem 3.3: Let Si be a set of maximally satisfiable sets of i-objective formulas, and σ a satisfiable
objective formula. Suppose Sa is of max. b-depth k− 1 and Sb is of max. a-depth j − 1. Then there is a
model M∗ = 〈e∗ka, e∗
j
b, w
∗〉 such that M∗ |= σ, Sa = Obj+a (e∗ka) and Sb = Obj+b (e∗
j
b).
8It is interesting to note that such a formulation of Levesque’s properties is not straightforward in the first-order case. That
is, for the quantified language, it is known that there are epistemic states that can not be characterized using only objective
formulas [Levesque & Lakemeyer 2001]. Thus, it is left open how one must correctly generalize the features of first-order
ONL.
9A maximally satisfiable set is to be understood as a semantically characterized complete description of a possibility,
analogous to a proof theoretically characterized notion of maximally consistent set of formulas.
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Proof: Consider Sa. Each S′ ∈ Sa is a maximally satisfiable a-objective set, and thus by defini-
tion, there is a k-structure 〈w′, ek−1
b
〉 such that {}, ek−1
b
, w′ |= S′. Define such a set of k-structures
{〈w′, ek−1
b
〉}, corresponding to each S′ ∈ Sa, and let this be e∗ka. It is immediate to verify that
Obj+a (e
∗k
a) = Sa. Analogously, for e∗
j
b using Sb. Finally, there is clearly some world w∗ where σ
holds.
3.1 On Validity
How does the semantics compare to earlier approaches? In particular, we are interested in valid for-
mulas. Lakemeyer ([1993]) proposes a semantics using K45n-canonical models, but he shows that the
formula ¬Oa¬Obp for any proposition p is valid. Intuitively, it says that all that Alice knows is that
Bob does not only know p, and as Lakemeyer argues, the validity of ¬Oa¬Obp is unintuitive. After all,
Bob could honestly tell Alice that he does not only know p. The negation of this formula, on the other
hand, is satisfiable in a Kripke structure approach by Halpern ([1993]), called the i-set approach.10 It
is also satisfiable in the k-structure semantics. Interestingly, the i-set approach and k-structures agree
on one more notion. The formula La⊥ ⊃ ¬Na¬Ob¬Oap (ζ) is valid in both, while ¬ζ is satisfiable
wrt. Lakemeyer ([1993]). (It turns out that the validity of ζ in our semantical framework is implicitly
related to the satisfiability of Ob¬Oap, so this property is not unreasonable.)
However, we immediately remark that the i-set approach and k-structures do not share too many
similarities beyond those presented above. In fact, the i-set approach does not truly satisfy Levesque’s
second property. For instance, Na¬Obp ∧ La¬Obp (λ) is satisfiable in Halpern ([1993]). Recall that,
in this property, the union of models that evaluate Niα and Liα must lead to all conceivable states. So,
the satisfiability of λ leaves open the question as to why Obp is not considered since ¬Obp is true at all
conceivable states. We show that, in contrast, λ is not satisfiable in the k-structures approach. Lastly,
[Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] involves enriching the language, the intuitions of which are perhaps best
explained after reviewing the proof theory, and so we defer discussions to later.11
Theorem 3.4: The following are properties of the semantics:
1. Oa¬Obp, for any p ∈ Φ, is satisfiable.
2. |= La⊥ ⊃ ¬Na¬Ob¬Oap.
3. Na¬Obp ∧La¬Obp is not satisfiable.
Proof: Item 1. Let Wp = {w | w |= p} and let E be all subsets of W except the set Wp. It is easy to
see that if e1b ∈ E, then {}, e1b , w 6|= Obp, for any world w. Now, define a e2 for a that has all ofW×E.
Thus, e2a, {}, w |= Oa¬Obp.
Item 2. Suppose eka, {}, w |= La⊥ for anyw ∈ W . Then, for all 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 ∈ eka, eka, e
k−1
b , w
′ |= ⊥,
and thus, eka = {}. Suppose now eka, {}, w |= Na¬Ob¬Oap. Then, wrt. all of 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ eka i.e. all of
E
k
, ¬Ob¬Oap must hold. That is, ¬Ob¬Oap must be valid. From above, we know this is not the case.
10In his original formulation, Halpern ([1993]) constructs trees. We build on discussions in [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001].
11An approach by [Waaler 2004; Waaler & Solhaug 2005] is also motivated by the proof theory. Discussions are deferred.
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Item 3. Suppose eka, {}, w |= La¬Obp, for any w. Then, for all 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 ∈ eka, eka, e
k−1
b
, w′ |=
¬Obp. Since Obp is satisfiable, there is a e∗k−1b such that {}, e
∗k−1
b
, w∗ |= Obp, and 〈w∗, e∗k−1b 〉 6∈ e
k
a.
Then, eka, {}, w |= ¬Na¬Obp.
Thus, k-structures seem to satisfy our intuitions on the behavior of only-knowing. To understand why,
notice that ¬Oa¬Obp and λ involve the nesting of Ni operators. Lakemeyer ([1993]) makes an un-
avoidable technical commitment. A (i-objective) possibility is formally a maximally K45n-consistent
set of basic i-objective formulas. The restriction to basic formulas is an artifact of a semantics based on
the canonical model. Unfortunately, there is more to agent i’s possibility than just basic formulas. In the
case of Halpern ([1993]), the problem seems to be that Ni and Li do not interact naturally, and that the
full complement of epistemic possibilities is not considered in interpreting Ni. In contrast, Theorem 3.3
shows that we allow non-basic formulas and by using a strictly semantic notion, we avoid problems that
arise from the proof-theoretic restrictions. And, since the semantics faithfully complies with the second
property, λ is not satisfiable.
The natural question is if there are axioms that characterize the semantics. We begin, in the next
section, with a proof theory by Lakemeyer ([1993]) that is known to be sound and complete for all
attempts so far, but for a restricted language.
4 Proof Theory
In the single agent case, ONL’s proof theory consists of axioms of propositional logic, axioms that
treat L and N as a classical belief operator in K45, an axiom that allows us to use N and L freely
on subjective formulas, modus ponens (MP) and necessitation (NEC) for both L and N as inference
rules, and the following axiom:12
A5.Nα ⊃ ¬Lα if ¬α is a propositionally consistent
objective formula.
As we shall see, only the axiom A5 is controversial, since extending any objective α to any i-objective α
is problematic. Mainly, the soundness of the axiom in the single agent case relies on propositional logic.
But in the multi-agent case, since we go beyond propositional formulas establishing this consistency
is non-trivial, and even circular. To this end, Lakemeyer ([1993]) proposes to resolve this consistency
by relying on the existing logic K45n. As a consequence, his proof theoretic formulation appropriately
generalizes all of Levesque’s axioms, except for A5 where its application is restricted to only basic
i-objective consistent formulas. We use ⊢ to denote provability.
Definition 4.1: ONL−n consists of all formulas α in ONLn such that no Nj may occur in the scope
of a Li or a Ni, for i 6= j.
The following axioms, along with MP and NEC (for Li and Ni) is an axiomatization that we refer to
as AXn. AXn is sound and complete for the canonical model and the i-set approach for formulas in
ONL−n .
12Strictly speaking, this is not the proof theory introduced in [Levesque 1990], where an axiom replaces the inference rule
NEC. Here, we consider an equivalent formulation by Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001]).
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A1n. All instances of propositional logic,
A2n. Li(α ⊃ β) ⊃ (Liα ⊃ Liβ),
A3n.Ni(α ⊃ β) ⊃ (Niα ⊃Niβ),
A4n. σ ⊃ Liσ ∧Niσ for i-subjective σ,
A5n.Niα ⊃ ¬Liα if ¬α is a K45n-consistent
i-objective basic formula.
Observe that, as discussed, the soundness of A5n is built on K45n-consistency. Since our semantics is
not based on Kripke structures, proving that every K45n-consistent formula is satisfiable in some (k, j)-
model is not immediate. We propose a construction called the (k, j)-correspondence model. In the
following, in order to disambiguate W from Kripke worlds, we shall refer to our worlds as propositional
valuations.
Definition 4.2: The K45n canonical model M c = 〈Wc, pic,Kca,Kcb〉 is defined as follows:
1. Wc = {w | w is a (basic) maximally consistent set }
2. for all p ∈ Φ and worlds w, pic(w)(p) = true iff p ∈ w
3. (w,w′) ∈ Kci iff w\Li ⊆ w′, w\Li = {α | Liα ∈ w}
Definition 4.3: GivenM c, define a set of propositional valuations W such that for each world w ∈ Wc,
there is a valuation JwK ∈ W , JwK = {p | p ∈ w}.
Definition 4.4: Given M c and a world w ∈ Wc, construct a (k, j)-model 〈eJwKka, eJwK
j
b
, JwK〉 from
valuations W inductively:
1. eJwK1a = {〈Jw
′K, {}〉 | w′ ∈ Kca(w)},
2. eJwKka = {〈Jw
′K, eJw′K
k−1
b
〉 | w′ ∈ Kca(w)},
where eJw′Kk−1b = {〈Jw
′′K, eJw′′K
k−2
a
〉 | w′′ ∈ Kcb(w
′)}.
Further, eJwK
j
b
is constructed analogously. Let us refer to this model as the (k, j)-correspondence model
of (M c, w).
Roughly, Defn. 4.4 is a construction of a (k, j)-model that appeals to the accessibility relations in the
canonical model.13 Thus, a e1a for Alice wrt. w has precisely the valuations of Kripke worlds w′ ∈
Kca(w). Quite analogously, a eka is a set {〈Jw′K, ek−1〉}, where w′ ∈ Kca(w) as before, but ek−1 is an
epistemic state for Bob and hence refers all worlds w′′ ∈ Kcb(w′). By a induction on the depth of a
basic formula α, we obtain a theorem that α of maximal a, b-depth k, j is satisfiable at (M c, w) iff the
(k, j)-correspondence model satisfies the formula.
13The construction is somewhat similar to the notion of generated submodels of Kripke frames [Hughes & Cresswell 1984].
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Theorem 4.5: For all basic formulas α in ONL−n and of maximal a, b-depth of k, j,
M c, w |= α iff eJwKka, eJwK
j
b
, JwK |= α.
Proof: By definition, the proof holds for propositional formulas, disjunctions and negations. So let us
say the result holds for formulas of a, b-depth 1. Suppose nowM c, w |= Laα, where Laα has a, b-depth
of 1, 2. Then for all w′ ∈ Kca(w), M c, w′ |= α iff (by induction hypothesis) eJw′K1a, eJw′K1b , Jw′K |= α
iff eJwK2a, {}, JwK |= Laα. By construction, we also have eJwK
1
a
, {}, JwK |= Laα. Since b’s structure is
irrelevant, we get eJwK1a, eJwK
2
b
, JwK |= Laα proving the hypothesis.
For the other direction, suppose eJwK1a, eJwK
2
b
, JwK |= Laα. For all Jw′K ∈ eJwK1a, eJwK
1
a
, {}, Jw′K |= α
iff (by hyp.) M c, w′ |= α for all w′ ∈ Kca(w) iff M c, w |= Laα.
Lemma 4.6: Every K45n-consistent basic formula α is satisfiable wrt. some (k, j)-model.
Proof: It is a property of the canonical model that every K45n-consistent basic formula is satisfiable
wrt. the canonical model. Supposing that the formula has a a, b-depth of k, j then from Thm 4.5, we
know there is at least the correspondence (k, j)-model that also satisfies the formula.
Theorem 4.7:
For all α ∈ ONL−n , if AXn ⊢ α then |= α.
Proof: The soundness is easily shown to hold for A1n −A4n. The soundness of A5n is shown by
induction on the depth. Suppose α is a propositional formula, and say ¬α is a consistent propositional
formula (and hence K45n-consistent). Then there is a world w∗ such that {}, {}, w∗ |= ¬α. Given a
eka, if 〈w∗, ek−1b 〉 ∈ e
k
a for some ek−1b , then e
k
a, {}, w |= ¬Laα for any world w. If not, then eka, {}, w |=
¬Naα. Thus, eka, {}, w |= Naα ⊃ ¬Laα. Wlog, assume the proof holds for a-objective formulas of
max. b-depth k−1. Suppose now, α is such a formula, and ¬α is K45n-consistent. By Lemma 4.6, there
is 〈w∗, e∗k−1b 〉, such that {}, e∗
k−1
b , w
∗ |= ¬α. Again, if 〈w∗, e∗k−1b 〉 ∈ eka, then eka, {}, w |= ¬Laα and
if not, then eka, {}, w |= ¬Naα.
We proceed with the completeness over the following definition, and lemmas.
Definition 4.8: A formula ψ is said to be independent of the formula φ wrt. an axiom system AX, if
neither AX ⊢ φ ⊃ ψ nor AX ⊢ φ ⊃ ¬ψ.
Lemma 4.9: [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001] If φ1, . . . , φm are K45n-consistent basic i-objective for-
mulas then there exists a basic i-objective formula ψ of the form Ljψ′ (j 6= i) that is independent of
φ1, . . . , φm wrt. K45n.
Lemma 4.10: In the lemma above, if φi are i-objective and of maximal j-depth k for j 6= i, then there
is a ψ of j-depth 2k + 2.
Lemma 4.11: [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001] If φ and ψ are i-objective basic formulas, and if Liφ ∧
Niψ is AXn-consistent, then φ ∨ ψ is valid.
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Lemma 4.12: [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001] Every formula α ∈ ONLn is provably equivalent to one
in the normal form (written below for n = {a, b}):
∨
(σ∧Laϕa0∧¬Laϕa1 . . .∧¬Laϕam1 ∧Lbϕb0 . . .∧¬Lbϕbm2 ∧Naψa0 . . .∧¬Naψan1 ∧Nbψb0 . . .∧
¬Nbψbn2)
where σ is a propositional formula, and ϕim and ψin are i-objective. If α ∈ ONL−n , ϕim and ψin are
basic.
Theorem 4.13: For all formulas α ∈ ONL−n , if |= α then AXn ⊢ α.
Proof: It is sufficient to prove that every AXn-consistent formula ξ is satisfiable wrt. some (k, j)-
model. If ξ is basic, then by Lemma 4.6, the statement holds. If ξ is not basic, then wlog, it can be
considered in the normal form:
∨
(σ∧Laϕa0∧¬Laϕa1 . . .∧¬Laϕam1 ∧Lbϕb0 . . .∧¬Lbϕbm2 ∧Naψa0 . . .∧¬Naψan1 ∧Nbψb0 . . .∧
¬Nbψbn2)
where σ is a propositional formula, and ϕim and ψin are i-objective and basic. Since σ is propositional
and consistent, there is clearly a world w∗ such that w∗ |= σ. We construct a k′-structure such that it
satisfies all the a-subjective formulas in the normal form above. Following that, a j′-structure for all the
b-subjective formulas is constructed identically. The resulting (k′, j′)-model (with w∗) satisfies ξ.
Let A be all K45n-consistent formulas of the form ϕa0 ∧ ψa0 ∧ ¬ϕaj (for j ≥ 1) or the form
ϕa0 ∧ ψa0 ∧ ¬ψaj . Let γ be independent of all formulas in A, as in Lemma 4.9 and 4.10. Note that,
while we take ξ itself to be of maximal a, b-depth of k, j, the depth of ϕa0, . . . being a-objective are of
maximal b-depth k− 1, and hence γ is of b-depth 2k (Lemma 4.10). Given a consistent set of formulas,
the standard Lindenbaum construction can be used to construct a maximally consistent set of formulas,
all of a maximal b-depth k − 1. That is, a formula is considered in the construction only if it has a
maximal b-depth k−1. Now, let Sa be a set of all maximally consistent sets of formulas, constructed by
only considering formulas of maximal b-depth k − 1, and containing ϕa0 ∧ (¬ψa0 ∨ (ψa0 ∧ γ)). Since
each of these consistent sets are basic and a-objective, they are satisfiable by Lemma 4.6. Thus the sets
S′ ∈ Sa are satisfiable wrt. 2k-structures 〈w, e2kb 〉. Let k′ = 2k + 1. By constructing a k′-structure for
Alice, say ek′a , from each 〈w, e2kb 〉 for every S′ ∈ Sa, we have that Obja(ek
′
a ) = Sa. We shall show that
all the a-subjective formulas in the normal form are satisfied wrt. 〈ek′a , {}, w∗〉.
Since for all S′ ∈ Sa, we have ϕa0 ∈ S′ we get that ek
′
a , {}, w
∗ |= Laϕa0. Now, since Laϕa0 ∧
¬Laϕaj is consistent, it must be that ϕa0 ∧ ¬ϕaj is consistent. For suppose not, then ¬ϕa0 ∨ ϕaj is
provable and thus, we have ϕa0 ⊃ ϕaj . We then prove Laϕa0 ⊃ Laϕaj , and since we have Laϕa0 we
prove Laϕaj , clearly inconsistent with Laϕa0 ∧¬Laϕaj . Now that ϕa0 ∧¬ϕaj is consistent, we either
have that ϕa0 ∧ ¬ϕaj ∧ ψa0 or ϕa0 ∧ ¬ϕaj ∧ ¬ψa0 is consistent. With the former, we also have that
ϕa0 ∧ ¬ϕaj ∧ ψa0 ∧ γ is consistent. There are maximally consistent sets that contain one of them, both
of which contain ¬ϕaj . This means that, ek
′
a , {}, w
∗ |= ¬Laϕaj .
Now, consider some k′-structure 〈w•, e•2kb 〉 6∈ ek
′
a . One of the following a-objective formulas must
hold wrt. this k′-structure: (a) ϕa0 ∧ ψa0, (b) ϕa0 ∧ ¬ψa0, (c) ¬ϕa0 ∧ ψa0 or (d) ¬ϕa0 ∧ ¬ψa0. It can
not be (d), since Laϕa0 ∧ Naψa0 is consistent, and this implies that ϕa0 ∨ ψa0 is valid (by Lemma
4.11). It certainly cannot be (b), for it would be in some S′ ∈ Sa. This leaves us with options (c) and
(a), both of which have ¬ψa0. Since the k′-structure was arbitrary, we must have for all 〈w, e2kb 〉 6∈ ek
′
a ,
{}, e2kb , w |= ψa0. Thus, ek
′
a , {}, w
∗ |= Naψa0.
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Finally, since Naψa0 ∧ ¬Naψaj is consistent, it must be that ψa0 ∧ ¬ψaj is consistent. Further,
either ψa0 ∧¬ψaj ∧ϕa0 or ψa0 ∧¬ψaj ∧¬ϕa0 is consistent. If the former, then ψa0 ∧¬ψaj ∧ϕa0 ∧¬γ
is also consistent. Let β be that which is consistent. Note that ¬β ∧ (ϕa0 ∧ (¬ψa0 ∨ (ψa0 ∧ γ))) is
consistent, and hence part of all S′ ∈ Sa. This means that ek
′
a , {}, w
∗ |= La(¬β). But since β itself is
consistent, there is a k′-structure such that {}, e•(b,2k), w
• |= β. And this k′-structure can not be in ek′a .
This means that ek′a , {}, w∗ |= ¬Naψaj . Thus, all the a-subjective formulas in the normal form above
are satisfiable wrt. ek′a .
Now, observe that, although La⊥ ⊃ ¬Na¬Ob¬Oap (ζ) from Theorem 3.4 is valid, yet it is not deriv-
able from AXn. In fact, the soundness result is easily extended to the full language ONLn. Then, the
proof theory cannot be complete for the full language since there is ζ ∈ ONLn such that 6⊢ ζ and |= ζ .
Similarly, the validity of non-provable formulas ¬Oa¬Obp and ζ wrt. the canonical model and the i-set
approach respectively, show that although AXn is also sound for the full language in these approaches,
it cannot be compelete. Mainly, axiom A5n has to somehow go beyond basic formulas. As Halpern and
Lakemeyer ([2001]) discuss, the problem is one of circularity. We would like the axiom to hold for any
α such that it is a consistent i-objective formula, but to deal with consistency we have to clarify what
the axiom system looks like.
The approach taken by Halpern and Lakemeyer is to introduce validity (and its dual satisfiability)
directly into the language. Formulas in the new language, ONL+n , are shown to be provably equivalent
to ONLn. Some new axioms involving validity and satisfiability are added to the axiom system, and
the resultant proof theory AX+n is shown to be sound and complete for formulas in ONL+n , wrt. an
extended canonical model. (An extended canonical model follows the spirit of the canonical model
construction but by considering maximally AX+n -consistent sets, and treat Li and Ni as two indepen-
dent modal operators.) So, one approach is to show that for formulas in the extended language the set
of valid formulas overlap in the extended canonical model and k-structures. But then, as we argued,
axiomatizing validity is not natural. Also, the proof theory is difficult to use. And in the end, we would
still understand the axioms to characterize a semantics bridged on proof-theoretic elements.
Again, what is desired is a generalization of Levesque’s axiom A5, and nothing more. To this end,
we propose a new axiom system, that is subtly related to the structure of formulas as are parameters k
and j. The axiom system has an additional t-axioms, and is to correspond to a sequence of languages
ONLtn.
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Definition 4.14: Let ONL1n = ONL−n . Let ONLt+1n be all Boolean combinations of formulas of
ONLtn and formulas of the form Liα and Niα for α ∈ ONLtn.
It is not hard to see that ONLt+1n ⊇ ONLtn. Note that t here does not correspond to the depth of
formulas. Indeed, a formula of the form (LbLa)k+1p is already in ONL−n . Let AX t+1n be an axiom
system consisting of A1n −A4n, MP, NEC and A51n −A5t+1n defined inductively as:
A5
1
n.Niα ⊃ ¬Liα, if ¬α is a K45n-consistent
i-objective basic formula.
A5
t+1
n .Niα ⊃ ¬Liα, if ¬α ∈ ONLtn, is i-objective,
and consistent wrt. A1n −A4n, A51n −A5tn .
14The idea was also suggested by a reviewer in [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] for an axiomatic characterization of the ex-
tended canonical model, although its completeness was left open.
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Theorem 4.15: For all α ∈ ONLtn, if AX tn ⊢ α then |= α.
Proof: We prove by induction on t. The case of AX1n is identical to Theorem 4.7. So, for the induction
hypothesis, let us assume that wrt. AX tn, if AX tn ⊢ β for β ∈ ONLtn then |= β. Now, suppose that
¬α is consistent wrt. AX tn and is a-objective. This implies that 6|= α. Thus, there is some k-structure
〈w∗, e∗kb 〉 such that {}, e∗kb , w∗ |= ¬α. Suppose now 〈w∗, e∗kb 〉 ∈ ek+1a then ek+1a , {}, w′ |= ¬Laα and
if not then ek+1a , {}, w′ |= ¬Naα. Thus, ek+1a , {}, w′ |= Naα ⊃ ¬Laα, demonstrating the soundness
of AX t+1n .
We establish completeness in a manner identical to Theorem 4.13, and thus it necessary to ensure that
Lemma 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 hold for non-basic formulas.
Lemma 4.16: If φ1, . . . , φm are AX tn-consistent i-objective formulas, then there is a basic formula ψ
of the form Ljψ (j 6= i) that is independent of φ1, . . . , φm wrt. AX tn.
Proof: Suppose that φi are a-objective and of maximal b-depth k. A formula ψ of the form (LbLa)k+1p
(where p ∈ Φ is in the scope of k+1 LbLa) is shown to be independent of φ1, . . . , φm. Let us suppose
we can derive a γ of the form LbLaLbLa . . . p of maximal depth k, to show that neither ⊢ γ ⊃ ψ nor
⊢ γ ⊃ ¬ψ. Given any formula, the only axioms in AX tn that can introduce γ in the scope of modal
operators is A4n and A5tn. Applying A4n gives Lbγ or Nbγ, and then using the axiom again we have
LbLbγ or LbNbγ. It is easy to see that the resulting formulas are clearly independent from ψ. Applying
A5
t
n on the other hand, allows us to derive ⊢ γ ⊃ Naγ or ⊢ γ ⊃ ¬Laγ (γ is consistent wrt. AXtn and
hence also wrt. A5t−1n ). Again, we could show ⊢ γ ⊃ ¬Lb¬Laγ. Continuing this way, it might only
be possible to derive ¬Lb¬La . . .LbLa . . . p of depth 2k + 2, that is indeed independent of ψ.
Lemma 4.17: If φ and ψ are i-objective formulas, φ,ψ ∈ ONLtn and Liφ∧Niψ is AXt+1n -consistent
then |= φ ∨ ψ.
Proof: Suppose not. Then ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ is AX tn-consistent, and by A5t+1n we prove Na(φ ∨ ψ) ⊃
¬La(φ ∨ ψ), and thus, Naψ ⊃ ¬Laφ, and this is not AX t+1n -consistent with Laφ ∧Naψ.
Theorem 4.18: For all α ∈ ONLtn, if |= α then AXtn ⊢ α.
Proof: Proof by induction on t. It is sufficient to show that if a formula β ∈ ONLt+1n is AX t+1n -
consistent then it is satisfiable wrt. some model. We already have the proof for ONL1n (see Theorem
4.13). Let us assume the proof holds for all formulas α ∈ ONLtn. Particularly, this means that any
formula that is AXtn-consistent is satisfiable wrt. some (k′, j′)-model. Let α ∈ ONLt+1n (say of
maximal a, b-depth of k+1, j+1), and suppose that α is consistent wrt. AXt+1n . It is sufficient to show
that α is satisfiable. Wlog, we take it in the normal form:
∨
(σ∧Laϕa0∧¬Laϕa1 . . .∧¬Laϕam1 ∧Lbϕb0 . . .∧¬Lbϕbm2 ∧Naψa0 . . .∧¬Naψan1 ∧Nbψb0 . . .∧
¬Nbψbn2).
Note that, by definition, it must be that all of ϕim, ψin are at most in ONLtn (i.e. they may also be in
ONLt−1n , . . .), and i-objective. We proceed as we did for Theorem 4.13 but without restricting to basic
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formulas. LetA be all AXtn-consistent formulas of the form ϕa0∧ψa0∧¬ϕaj or ϕa0∧ψa0∧¬ψaj (they
are of maximal b-depth k). Let γ be independent of all formulas in A. Let Sa be the set of all (AXtn-)
maximally consistent sets of formulas, constructed from formulas of maximal b-depth k, and containing
ϕa0 ∧ (¬ψa0 ∨ (ψa0 ∧ γ)), and hence by induction hypothesis they are satisfiable in some model. Note
that all formulas in Sa are in ONLtn. The b-depth is maximally 2k + 2. Letting k′′ = 2k + 2, we have
that for all S′ ∈ Sa, there is a 〈w, ek
′′
b 〉 such that {}, ek
′′
b , w |= S
′
. Let k′ = k′′ + 1. Letting ek′a be all
such k′-structures 〈w, ek′′b 〉 for each S′ ∈ Sa makes Obj
+
a (e
k′
a ) = Sa (in contrast, for Thereom 4.13 we
dealt with Obja). We claim that this k′-structure for Alice, a j′-structure for Bob constructed similarly,
and a world where σ holds (there is such a world since σ is propositional and consistent) is a model
where α is satisfied. The proof proceeds as in Theorem 4.13. We show the case of ¬Laϕaj .
Since Laϕa0∧¬Laϕaj is consistent wrt.AX t+1n , it must be that ϕa0∧¬ϕaj is consistent wrt.AX t+1n .
Further, since ϕa0, ϕaj ∈ ONLtn, they must consistent be wrt.AXtn (for if not, they cannot by definition
be consistent wrt.AX t+1n ). This means that either ϕa0∧¬ϕaj ∧ψa0 or ϕa0∧¬ϕaj ∧¬ψa0 is consistent.
If the former is, then so is ϕa0 ∧ ¬ϕaj ∧ ψa0 ∧ γ. Since Sa consist of all AX tn-consistent formulas
containing ϕa0 ∧ (¬ψa0 ∧ (ψa0 ∧ γ)), there is clearly a S′ ∈ Sa such that ¬ϕaj ∈ S′. Consequently, it
can not be that ek′a , {}, w′ |= Laϕaj . Thus, ek
′
a , {}, w
′ |= ¬Laϕaj .
Thus, we have a sound and complete axiomatization for the propositional fragment of ONLn. In
comparison to Lakemeyer ([1993]), the axiomatization goes beyond a language that restricts the nesting
of Ni. In contrast to Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001]), the axiomatization does not necessitate the use of
semantic notions in the proof theory. A third axiomatization by [Waaler 2004; Waaler & Solhaug 2005]
proposes an interesting alternative to deal with the circularity in a generalized A5. The idea is to
first define consistency by formulating a fragment of the axiom system in the sequent calculus. Quite
analogous to having t-axioms, they allow us to apply A5n on i-objective formulas of a lower depth,
thus avoiding circularity without the need to appeal to satisfiability as in [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001].
Waaler and Solhaug ([2005]) also define a semantics for multi-agent only-knowing which does not
appeal to canonical models. Instead, they define a class of Kripke structures which need to satisfy
certain constraints. Unfortunately, these constraints are quite involved and, as the authors admit, the
nature of these models “is complex and hard to penetrate.”
To get a feel of the axiomatization, let us consider a well studied example from [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001]
to see where we differ. Suppose Alice assumes the following default: unless I know that Bob knows my
secret then he does not know it. If the default is all that she knows, then she nonmonotonically comes
to believe that Bob does not know her secret. Let γ be a proposition that denotes Alice’s secret, and
we want to show that ⊢ Oa(δ) ⊃ La¬Lbγ, where δ = ¬LaLbγ ⊃ ¬Lbγ. We write (Def.) to mean
Oaα ≡ Laα ∧Na¬α, and we freely reason with propositional logic (PL) or K45n.
1. Oa(δ) ⊃ La¬LaLbγ ⊃ La¬Lbγ Def.,PL,A2n
2. Oa(δ) ⊃Na¬LaLbγ ∧NaLbγ Def.,PL,K45n
3. NaLbγ ⊃ ¬LaLbγ A51n
4. ¬LaLbγ ⊃ La¬LaLbγ A4n
5. Oa(δ) ⊃ La¬LaLbγ 2,3,4,PL
6. Oa(δ) ⊃ La¬Lbγ 1,5,PL
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We use A51n, and it is applicable because ¬Lbγ is a-objective and K45n-consistent. Now, suppose
Alice is cautious. She changes her default to assume that if she does not believe Bob to only-know some
set of facts θ ∈ Φ, then θ is not all that he knows. We would like to show
⊢ Oa(¬LaObθ ⊃ ¬Obθ) ⊃ La¬Obθ
Of course, this default is different from δ in containing Obθ rather than Lbγ. The proof is identical,
except that we use A52n, since ¬Obθ ∈ ONL1n is a-objective and AX1n-consistent. The latter proof
requires reasoning with the satisfiability modal operator in Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001]), and is not
provable with the axioms of Lakemeyer ([1993]).
5 Autoepistemic Logic
Having examined the properties of multi-agent only-knowing, in terms of a semantics for both the first-
order and propositional case, and an axiomatization for the propositional case, in the current section
we discuss how the semantics also captures autoepistemic logic (AEL). AEL, as originally developed
by Moore ([1985]), intends to allow agents to draw conclusions, by making observations of their own
epistemic states. For instance, Alice concludes that she has no brother because if she did have one then
she would have known about it, and she does not know about it [Moore 1985]. The characterization
of such beliefs are defined using fixpoints called stable expansions. In the single agent case, Levesque
([1990]) showed that the beliefs of an agent who only-knows α is precisely the stable expansion of α.
Of course, the leverage with the former is that it is specified using regular entailments. In Lakemeyer
([1993]), and Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001]), a many agent generalization of AEL is considered
in the sense of a stable expansion for every agent, and relating this to what the agent only-knows. But
their generalizations are only for the propositional fragment, while Levesque’s definitions involved first-
order entailments. In contrast, we obtain the corresponding quantificational multi-agent generalization
of AEL. We state the main theorems below. The proofs are omitted since they follow very closely from
the ideas for the single agent case [Levesque & Lakemeyer 2001].
Definition 5.1: LetA be a set of formulas, and Γ is the i-stable expansion ofA iff it the set of first-order
implications of A ∪ {Liβ | β ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬Liβ | β 6∈ Γ}.
Definition 5.2: [Maximal structure] If eka is a k-structure, let e+a be a k-structure with the addition of all
〈w′, ek−1
b
〉 6∈ eka such that for every α ∈ ONL−n of maximal a, b-depth k, k− 1, if eka, {}, w |= Laα for
any world w then eka, ek−1b , w′ |= α. Define Γ = {β | β is basic and e+a , {}, w |= Laβ} as the belief set
of e+a .
Theorem 5.3: Let M = 〈e+a , e
j
b, w〉 be a model, where e+a is a maximal structure for a. Let Γ be the
belief set of e+a , and suppose α ∈ ONL−n is of maximal a, b-depth k, k − 1. Then, M |= Oaα iff Γ is
the a-stable expansion of α.
Theorem 5.3 essentially says that the complete set of basic beliefs at a maximal epistemic state where α
is all that i knows, precisely coincides with the i-stable expansion of α.
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6 Axiomatizing Validity
Extending the work in [Lakemeyer 1993] and [Halpern 1993], which was only restricted to formulas in
ONL−n , Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001]) proposed a multi-agent only-knowing logic that handles the
nesting of Ni operators. But as discussed, there are two undesirable features. The first is a semantics
based on canonical models, and the second is a proof theory that axiomatizes validity. Although such a
construction is far from natural, we show in this section that they do indeed capture the desired properties
of only-knowing. This also instructs us that our axiomatization avoids such problems in a reasonable
manner.
Recall that the language of [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] is ONL+n , which is ONLn and a modal
operator for validity, Val. A modal operator Sat, for satisfiability, is used freely such that Val(α) is
syntactically equivalent to ¬Sat(¬α). To enable comparisons, we present a variant of our logic, that
has all its main features, but has additional notions to handle the extended language. We then show that
this logic and [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] agree on the set of valid sentences from ONL+n (and also
ONLn).
The main feature of [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001] is the proof theory AX ′n, and a semantics that is
sound and complete for AX ′n via the extended canonical model. AX ′n consists of A1n −A4n, MP,
NEC and the following:
A5
′
n. Sat(¬α) ⊃ (Niα ⊃ ¬Laα), if α is i-objective.
V1. Val(α) ∧ Val(α ⊃ β) ⊃ Val(β).
V2. Sat(p1 ∧ . . . pn), if pi’s are literals and p1 ∧ . . . pn is
propositionally consistent.
V3. Sat(α ∧ β1) ∧ . . . Sat(α ∧ βk) ∧ Sat(γ ∧ δ1) . . . ∧
Sat(γ ∧ δm) ∧ Val(α ∨ γ) ⊃ Sat(Liα ∧ ¬Li¬β1 . . . ∧
Niγ ∧ ¬Ni¬δ1 . . .), if α, βi, γ, δi are i-objective.
V4. Sat(α) ∧ Sat(β) ⊃ Sat(α ∧ β), if α is i-objective
and β is i-subjective.
NECVal. From α infer Val(α).
The essence of our new logic, in terms of a notion of depth (with |Val(α)|i = |α|i) and a semantical
account over possible worlds, is as before. The complete semantic definition for formulas in ONL+n of
maximal a, b-depth of k, j is:
1. -8. as before,
9. eka, e
j
b
, w |= Val(α) if eka, e
j
b
, w |= α for all eka, e
j
b
, w.
Satisfiability and validity (|=) are understood analogously.15 Let ONL+n 1, . . . ONL+n t be also defined
analogously. Further, let axioms A1n −A5tn be defined for ONL+n
t
. For instance, A5tn is defined for
15Note that Val corresponds precisely to how validity is defined.
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any i-objective ¬α ∈ ONL+n t−1 that is consistent with A1n −A5t−1n . Then, the semantics above is
characterized by the proof theory AX+n
t defined (inductively) for ONL+n t, consisting of AXtn (A1n−
A5
t
n, MP, NEC) with NECVal as an additional inference rule.
Lemma 6.1: For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, AX+n
t
⊢ α iff |= α.
The proof of this lemma, and those of the following theorems are given in the appendix. We proceed to
show that Sat(α) is provable from AX ′n iff α is AX+n
t
-consistent.
Theorem 6.2: For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, AX ′n ⊢ Sat(α) iff α is AX+n t-consistent.
This allows us to show that AX ′n and AX+n
t
agree on provable sentences.
Theorem 6.3: For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, AX ′n ⊢ α iff AX+n t ⊢ α.
Lemma 6.4: For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, |= α iff α is valid in
[Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001].
Proof: AX ′n is sound and complete for [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001], and AX+n t is sound and com-
plete for |=.
Since it can be shown that every α ∈ ONL+n is provably equivalent to some α′ ∈ ONLn [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001],
we also obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 6.5: For all α ∈ ONLtn, |= α iff α is valid in [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001].
7 Conclusions
This paper has the following new results. We have a first-order modal logic for multi-agent only-
knowing that we show, for the first time, generalizes Levesque’s semantics. Unlike all attempts so far, we
neither make use of proof-theoretic notions of maximal consistency nor Kripke structures [Waaler & Solhaug 2005].
The benefit is that the semantic proofs are straightforward, and we understand possible worlds precisely
as Levesque meant. We then analyzed a propositional subset, and showed first that the axiom system
from Lakemeyer ([1993]) is sound and complete for a restricted language. We used this result to devise a
new proof theory that does not require us axiomatize any semantic notions [Halpern & Lakemeyer 2001].
Our axiomatization was shown to be sound and complete for the semantics, and its use is straightfor-
ward on formulas involving the nesting of at most operators. In the process, we revisited the features
of only-knowing and compared the semantical framework to other approaches. Its behavior seems to
coincide with our intuitions, and it also captures a multi-agent generalization of Moore’s AEL. Finally,
although the axiomatization of Halpern and Lakemeyer ([2001]) is not natural, we showed that they
essentially capture the desired properties of multi-agent only-knowing, but at much expense.
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9 Appendix
Lemma 6.1. For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, AX+n
t
⊢ α iff |= α.
Proof: The proof is via induction. Using Theorems 4.15 and 4.18 as the base cases in the induction,
there is one additional step on the structure of formulas.
Soundness: The base case holds for formulas α ∈ ONLtn for AX tn. Suppose now if AX tn ⊢ α,
then AX+n
t
⊢ Val(α). But if AXtn ⊢ α then (by induction hypothesis) at all models eka, ejb , w |= α, and
so by the definition at all models eka, e
j
b, w |= Val(α) or |= Val(α).
Completeness. For the base case, we know that if for all models eka, e
j
b , w |= α then AX
t
n ⊢ α.
Suppose |= Val(α), then by definition, for all models eka, e
j
b, w |= α iff (by hypothesis) AX tn ⊢ α. So,
AX+n
t
⊢ Val(α).
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Theorem 6.2. For all α ∈ ONL+n
t
, AX ′n ⊢ Sat(α) iff α is AX+n t-consistent.
Proof: It is helpful to have the following variant of Lemma 4.17 at hand, and a corollary thereof.
Lemma 9.1: Suppose φ,ψ ∈ ONL+n
t−1
are i-objective AX+n t-consistent formulas, and |= φ∨ψ. Then
Liφ ∧Niψ is AX+n
t
-consistent.
Proof: Suppose not. ThenAX+n
t
⊢ ¬(Laφ∧Naψ), that isAX+n
t
⊢ ¬Laφ∨¬Naψ. Then, by Lemma
6.1, |= ¬Laφ∨¬Naψ. Let Wφ = {w | w |= φ}. Let eka =Wφ×Ek−1 be a ek for Alice. Then clearly,
eka, {}, w 6|= ¬Laφ. It must be then that eka, {}, w |= ¬Naψ. Then there is some 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ eka such
that eka, ek−1b , w′ |= ¬ψ. And clearly, for all 〈w′, e
k−1
b 〉 6∈ e
k
a, e
k
a, e
k−1
b , w
′ |= ¬φ (by construction). It
follows that there is a 〈w′, ek−1b 〉 6∈ eka where eka,
ek−1b , w
′ |= ¬(φ ∨ ψ), contradicting the validity of φ ∨ ψ.
Corollary 9.2: Suppose α, β1, . . . βk, γ, δ1, . . . δm ∈ ONL+n
t−1
, are i-objective AX+n t-consistent for-
mulas, and |= α ∨ γ. Then Liα ∧ ¬Li¬β1 . . . ∧ ¬Li¬βk ∧Niγ ∧ ¬Niδ1 . . . ∧ ¬Ni¬δm is AX+n
t
-
consistent.
Returning to Theorem 6.2: Proof on the length of the derivative, using induction on t. Let α be a
consistent propositional formula. Then, by V2, AX ′n ⊢ Sat(α). Since it is a consistent propositional
formula, it is also AX+n
t
-consistent. Assume theorem holds for α ∈ ONL+n
t−1
. Suppose we have
Sat(α ∧ βk), Sat(γ ∧ δm),¬Sat(¬(α ∨ γ)) ∈ ONL+n
t−1 then by V3, AX ′n ⊢ Sat(Liα ∧ ¬Li¬βk ∧
Niγ ∧ ¬Ni¬δm). By hypothesis α ∧ βk, γ ∧ δm are AX+n
t
-consistent. And ¬(α ∨ γ) is not AX+n
t
-
consistent, and so AX+n
t
⊢ α∨γ. By Lemma 6.1, |= α∨γ. Clearly, by Corollary 9.2, Liα∧¬Li¬βk∧
Niγ ∧ ¬Ni¬δm is AX+n
t
-consistent. Finally, suppose that you have Sat(α) for some i-objective α and
Sat(β) for some i-subjective β, then by V4, AX ′n ⊢ Sat(α ∧ β). By induction hypothesis, α and β are
AX+n
t
-consistent. By Lemma 6.1, α is satisfiable and β is satisfiable, and so is α ∧ β. By Lemma 6.1,
α ∧ β is AX+n
t
-consistent. The other direction is symmetric.
Theorem 6.3. AX ′n ⊢ α iff AX+n t ⊢ α, for α ∈ ONL+n t.
Proof: Since axioms A1n − A4n, MP, NEC, NECVal are common to both, their use is not
discussed. To show that AX ′n ⊢ α ⇒ AX+n
t
⊢ α, suppose you had Sat(¬α) for some i-objective
α ∈ ONL+n
t−1 then using A5′n, one could show that Niα ⊃ ¬Liα. From Theorem 6.2, we also
know ¬α is AX+n
t−1
-consistent. Then, we can show Niα ⊃ ¬Liα as well using A5tn. V2,V3,V4
follow immediately from Theorem 6.2. Assuming now that the proof holds for base cases, using V1,
if AX ′n ⊢ Val(α) and AX ′n ⊢ Val(α ⊃ β) then AX ′n ⊢ Val(β). Now, by induction hypothesis,
AX+n
t
⊢ Val(α) iff by Lemma 6.1 |= Val(α), and so |= α. Similarly, |= α ⊃ β, and thus, |= β and
|= Val(β) by the semantics. By Lemma 6.1, AX+n
t
⊢ Val(β).
To show that AX+n
t
⊢ α ⇒ AX ′n ⊢ α, suppose ¬α ∈ ONL+n
t−1 is i-objective and AX t−1n -
consistent, then one can prove Niα ⊃ ¬Liα. Now, ¬α is also AX+n
t
-consistent and by Theorem 6.2,
AX ′n ⊢ Sat(¬α). Then we can prove Niα ⊃ ¬Liα, as desired.
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